Associative concept learning, stimulus equivalence, and relational frame theory : working out the similarities and differences between human and non-human behavior by Hughes, Sean Joseph & Barnes-Holmes, Dermot
ASSOCIATIVE CONCEPT LEARNING, STIMULUS EQUIVALENCE, AND RELATIONAL FRAME
THEORY: WORKING OUT THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMAN AND
NONHUMAN BEHAVIOR
SEAN HUGHES AND DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND MAYNOOTH, IRELAND
The question of what makes humans unique
has attracted considerable attention within the
behavioral sciences. Throughout much of the
past century it was assumed that those learning
principles identified in nonhumans could
stretch to, and account for, much of complex
human behavior (see Dymond, Roche, &
Barnes-Holmes, 2003; Hayes, 1987; Hayes,
Barnes-Holmes&Roche, 2001). This “continuity
assumption” served as an intellectual rudder
guiding early work in the field, with researchers
focusing pragmatically on nonhumans in order
to identify general learning principles that could
predict and influence the actions of our own
species. In many respects, this analytic strategy
was a successful one, yielding concepts that
appear to apply equally to humans and nonhu-
mans alike (e.g., reinforcement, punishment,
generalization, discrimination, extinction, recov-
ery and habituation). The continuity assumption
seemed to hold true.
However, when researchers turned their
attention to those hallmarks of human language
(and cognition) a number of important findings
started to emerge, findings that hinted at
learning processes or principles that may be
unique to, or largely elaborated in, some species
relative to others. For instance, verbal behavior
stubbornly refused to be analyzed in direct
contingency terms and early attempts to do so
(e.g., Skinner, 1957) did not yield a progressive
program of research. Furthermore, a growing
body of work on instructional control (or rule-
governed behavior) and stimulus equivalence
revealed that humans consistently respond in
ways that differ from their nonhuman counter-
parts (Galizio, 1979; Sidman, 1971). Thus it
seemed as if—at least in some cases—the
continuity assumption was beginning to crack
and strain.
Fast forward 40 years and these species-
related differences are still the subject of intense
controversy and debate (e.g., Hayes, 1989;
Kastak, Schusterman & Kastak, 2001; Lionello-
DeNolf, 2009; Sidman et al., 1982; Urcuioli,
2008). Some researchers have argued that the
behavioral processes involved in symbolic rela-
tions in human language are functionally similar
to those that are involved in human responding
on equivalence tasks (e.g., Hayes et al., 2001).
The key behavioral process (known as ‘arbitrari-
ly applicable relational responding’: AARR)
refers to the capacity to relate stimuli in ways
that (a) do not depend on the formal properties
of the to-be-related stimuli and (b) are con-
trolled by aspects of the context that have been
abstracted so that they can be arbitrarily applied
in a wide variety of ways. For instance, if humans
learn that A-Same-B and that B-Same-C, they will
form a number of bidirectional relations
between these stimuli in the absence of any
training or instruction to do so. That is, they will
act as if B-Same-A and C-Same-B (mutual entail-
ment) as well as if A-Same-C and C-Same-A
(combinatorial entailment). Furthermore, the
(psychological) properties of those stimuli will
also change in line with the manner in which
they were related (known as a transformation of
function). Thus, if an aversive function is
established for A by repeatedly pairing it with
an electric shock, B and C will also acquire
aversive properties despite the fact that they
were never paired with shocks at any point in
time (Dougher, Augustson, Markham, Green-
way, & Wulfert, 1994).
Although humans appear to learn AARR early
on in their development, existing evidence for
mutual and combinatorial entailment has been
difficult to find in other species such as pigeons
(Lionello-DeNolf, & Urcuioli, 2002), chimpan-
zees and baboons (Dugdale & Lowe, 2000;
Hayes, 1989; Sidman et al., 1982). Indeed,
studies demonstrate that even after extensive
training nonhumans find it difficult to produce
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the simplest form of AARR (i.e., symmetry or
mutual entailment). Moreover, in those cases
where positive evidence has been obtained for
symmetry responding, test performances can be
explained in ways that (a) do not involve AARR,
(b) are only present in a small subsection of the
sample, or (c) are emitted with unacceptably
low levels of accuracy (Lionello-DeNolf, 2009).
Nevertheless, more recent papers (including
the target article) argue that these failures to
observe AARR in animals stem from properties
of the test procedures themselves, and nonhu-
mans are capable of AARR under a set of highly
specific conditions.
The basic argument is that nonhumans
cannot only relate stimuli based on their
physical properties (perceptual concept learning)
or as a function of the relationship established
between or among physically related stimuli
(relational concept learning), but also derive
relations that were never directly trained or
instructed in the past (associative concept learn-
ing). In this latter case, the organism is argued to
relate stimuli in ways that do not depend on
their physical properties and in such a way that
these stimuli come to be functionally inter-
changeable with one another (i.e., respond in
an arbitrarily applicable fashion). These per-
formances are argued to mirror those observed
in humans, and by implication reflect a learning
process that stretches across the species divide.
This claim is backed by recent findings from
within the animal learning literature on ac-
quired equivalence and symmetry responding,
in which nonhumans purportedly relate stimuli
in untrained yet predictable ways.
Overall, we are both intrigued and excited by
the body of work contained in this review and
believe that it may accelerate our understanding
of animal as well as human cognition in several
ways. Before continuing, however, it is impor-
tant to recognize that these empirical develop-
ments are not incompatible or inconsistent with
Relational Frame Theory (RFT). Actually it’s
quite the opposite. Almost 20 years ago, Barnes
and Roche (1996) wrote:
RFT recognizes that very limited forms
of derived behavior may occur without a
history of explicitly reinforced equiva-
lence responding (see Hayes & Wilson,
1993; see also Zentall and Urcuioli,
1993, for evidence that suggests derived
behavior may occur in nonhumans).
Nevertheless, these types of behavior are
normally defined as largely respondent
because they do not emerge from an
appropriate history of arbitrarily appli-
cable relational responding (note, this is
a purely functional distinction).Respon-
dent behavior is, however, considered to
be an important foundation for rela-
tional framing (see Barnes, 1994, for a
detailed discussion of this issue in terms
of indirect reflexivity) (p. 501).
It is also interesting to note, that in that same
article Barnes and Roche presented some
speculative RFT-based analyses concerning the
relationship between identity matching (or
reflexivity) and derived symmetry responding,
concluding that the “issue will clearly require
some very precise and delicate analyses by those
researchers who specialize in nonhuman stimu-
lus control” (p. 502). The empirical work that is
reviewed in the current target article provides,
in our view, some of the finest examples of the
very research that Barnes and Roche called for
back in the mid-1990s.
Despite these positives, we believe that an
argument for AARR in nonhumans currently
faces a number of challenges. We know that
AARR is characterized (at least in humans) by its
flexibility. For instance, humans can respond to
stimuli as if they are equivalent or symmetrically
related based on verbal instructions (Smeets,
Dymond & Barnes-Holmes, 2000), conditional
discrimination tasks (Dougher et al., 1994) and
respondent-like training procedures (Leader &
Barnes-Holmes, 2001). Equivalence (and other
derived relations) also emerge regardless of
whether a Many-to-One (MTO), One-To-Many
(OTM) or linear training and testing design is
employed (i.e., where A is related to B and B
related to C; Arntzen, Grondahl, & Eilifsen,
2010; Arntzen & Holth, 1997). No strict tempo-
ral or spatial ordering between the sample and
comparison stimulimust be implemented, nor is
concurrent identity or successive matching
training required, in order to observe these
effects in verbal humans.
If Zentall et al. (2013) are correct, and
nonhumans are capable of AARR in the same
way as their human counterparts, then they
appear to be restricted to the most rudimentary
features of that behavior, which emerge only
under the strictest of experimental conditions.
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The work highlighted in their review suggests
that symmetry may depend on successive
matching in which the sample and comparison
stimuli are presented one after the other in the
same location (and close in time). This seems to
differ functionally from the symmetry perform-
ances observed in humans that emerge regard-
less of the training protocol used. Likewise, the
difficulty of observing equivalence perform-
ances on OTM (and perhaps even linear
training and testing designs) also differs from
comparable performances in humans (Arntzen
et al., 2010). When taken together, the reviewed
research does not (convincingly) demonstrate
the flexibility that is characteristic of AARR in
our own species.
It also seems important to acknowledge that
humans are not shackled to associative concept
learning (or relating stimuli on the basis of
equivalence) in their interactions with the
environment but can instead behave as if stimuli
are related to one another in many different
ways. Indeed, findings indicate that this ability to
respond in an arbitrarily applicable fashion
enables humans to relate stimuli as opposite
(Dymond& Barnes, 1996), and as hierarchically
(Gil, Luciano, Ruiz & Valdivia-Salas, 2012),
comparatively (Vitale, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes & Campbell, 2008), deictically
(McHugh & Stewart, 2012), temporally and/
or causally (O’Hora et al., 2008) related (see
Dymond & Roche, 2013, for a recent review).
This work also suggests that when non-equiva-
lence relations are involved, stimulus functions
are not simply transferred but rather transformed
through those relations in nonequivalent ways.
For instance, if humans learn that A-Opposite-B-
Same-C and A-Opposite-Shock they may come to
approach A and avoid B or C (see Whelan &
Barnes-Holmes, 2004).
Thus, while equivalence appears to be one of
the first types of derived relations to emerge in a
human infant’s repertoire (Luciano, Gomez-
Becerra, & Rodriguez-Valverde, 2007), other
relations play a defining role in how we adapt to
the world around us. Deictic relations (I-You/
Here-There/ Now-Then) seem to dominate many
self- and perspective-taking behaviors (McHugh
& Stewart, 2012) while temporality and causality
may be central to many rule-governed behaviors
(Torneke, Luciano, & Valdivia Salas, 2008).
Even classification or categorization itself can
involve stimuli that are hierarchically related in
nonequivalent ways. For example, within the
superordinate category ‘foods’ there may be
classes of stimuli that are related on the basis of
opposition (‘poisonous vs. nonpoisonous
foods’), comparison (‘cheap vs. expensive
foods’), deictics (‘foods I like vs. don’t like’)
or difference (‘meat vs. vegetables’). Develop-
ing an account of the relational responses
involved in these types of complex categoriza-
tion abilities, in terms of associative concept
learning (equivalence) alone, will certainly be
very challenging (see Dymond & Barnes, 1995,
for an empirical example of AARR responding
in accordance with just two relational frames—
same and comparison—which proved difficult to
explain in terms of equivalence responding).
Despite these challenges, we must emphasize
again that we are genuinely excited and
intrigued by the work presented in the target
article. Although a number of important ques-
tions still need to be addressed before we can
conclude AARR in nonhumans is functionally
similar to that observed in our own species, we
nevertheless believe that the research outlined
here represents a golden opportunity to develop
much needed dialogue between animal and
human learning researchers on issues that are
central to both traditions. Importantly, this
dialogue is not a one-way street: The lessons
learned in human research may stimulate
developments in the animal literature and
vice-versa. For instance, research on animal
cognition may provide new insights into human
cognition by identifying how basic forms of
(respondent) learning are selected, modified,
strengthened and elaborated by the (verbal)
operant contingencies that RFT argues are
crucial for the emergence of increasingly
complex forms of AARR. Animal preparations
and populations may also allow us to examine
questions about AARR that cannot be tackled
with humans for ethical and practical reasons. In
particular, the research considered in the target
article could help us understand how young
infants might transition from very basic to more
complex forms of AARR.
Recent work on human cognition could also
unlock new insights into animal learning. It may
well be that there is some level of relational
complexity, contextual control or generalizabil-
ity that humans are capable of that is not seen
elsewhere in the animal kingdom. For instance,
to what degree are other species restricted to
equivalence (or associative concept) learning
and can they respond to stimuli as opposite,
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more than/less than, hierarchically, temporally
or casually related in an arbitrarily applicable
fashion? Can they relate entire equivalence
relations to other equivalence relations and
form increasingly complex networks of stimulus
relations (e.g., Barnes, Hegarty, & Smeets,
1997)? If so, then what implications does this
have for our understanding of animal cognition,
reasoning and creativity? What type, amount
and order of training are required before
relational responding becomes abstracted and
generalizes to novel stimuli? Is it the case that
this advanced type of relational learning
stretches across many different evolutionary
branches or is it unique to a small number of
species? Again, if so, then why? Are there certain
environmental or evolutionary conditions nec-
essary in order to observe the emergence of
complex forms of AARR (e.g., Hayes & Long,
2013; Smet & Byrne, in press)? Chasing these
(and related) issues will not only lead to a better
understanding of human and animal cognition
but also identify important lines of fracture
between and among species. The work pre-
sented by Zentall et al. already draws attention to
potential lines of fracture between human and
nonhuman behavior in terms of the restricted
set of conditions under which nonhuman
equivalence responding is seen to emerge. We
look forward to increased collaboration and
communication between animal learning and
RFT researchers as we continue to explore the
commonalities that bind, and the differences
that separate, humans from other species in the
animal kingdom.
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